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The  main  aim  of this  paper  is  to  examine  the  impact  of  changing  external  conditions  on  irrigation  water
institutions  in  northern  China.  To this  end,  we  perform  a case  study  analysis  of the  impact  of  output
market  development  on  irrigation  water  transactions,  using  survey  data  collected  among  315  households
in  Minle  County,  Zhangye  City,  Gansu  Province,  covering  the  year  2009.  Households  in  this  region  possess
tradable  water  use  rights.  Moreover,  a major  agro-processing  company  has recently  been  established  andrrigation water
nstitutional change
utput  market
ransaction costs
hina
the  local  government  intervenes  in the  allocation  of  water  to stimulate  farmers  to  grow  a  cash  crop  for
that  company.  Despite  these  favourable  enabling  and  driving  factors,  we  ﬁnd  that  market  water  trade  is
virtually  absent.  Instead,  we  observe  that  reciprocal  water  use  arrangements  (water  swaps)  have  emerged
at  a limited  scale.  We  argue  that factors  other  than  an  improvement  in  the  output  market  (such  as producer
ignorance,  centrally  set  prices,  trust)  need  to be  considered,  if improvement  in the  market  for  irrigation
water  is to occur.. Introduction
China is a country with substantial water resources, but their
egional distribution is highly unequal. Water availability in the
orth (757 m3 per person in 2003) is almost 25% below the inter-
ationally accepted water scarcity threshold of 1000 m3 per person,
hile water availability in the south (3208 m3 per person in 2003)
s relatively abundant (Shalizi, 2006).
The water resources available for agricultural production in
hina are rapidly declining due to increased water demand for
ndustrial use and household consumption. The use of water in
griculture as a share of total water use has steadily declined from
round 80% in 1980 to 61.3% in 2011 (Shalizi, 2006; National Bureau
f Statistics of China, 2012). Technical innovations as well as water
olicy and management reforms are required to improve water use
fﬁciency in agriculture to meet growing food demands (Rosegrant
nd Cai, 2002; Yang et al., 2003). The Ministry of Water Resources of
he PR China has initiated a number of pilot projects to gain expe-
ience with the development of water-saving irrigation systems.
he ﬁrst of these pilot projects was initiated early 2002 in Zhangye
ity, an oasis with rich agricultural resources in Gansu Province
n northern China. Measures taken under this project include the
onstruction of an engineering system that optimizes the water
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distribution and an innovative system of water resources property
rights allocation and trading.
Zhang (2007) and Zhang et al. (2009) examine the water prop-
erty rights system that was  implemented in Zhangye City. These
studies ﬁnd that high transaction costs in some parts of the region,
and management, legal, administrative and ﬁscal barriers in cases
where transaction costs are low, discourage farmers from saving
and trading surplus water. As a result, trading of water use rights
is almost non-existent in this pilot project area.
Induced institutional innovation theory suggests that new
institutions, such as tradable water use rights and non-market
institutions, may  emerge when resources become more scarce due
to growing population density, commercialization of agriculture,
or exogenous technological change (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985;
Platteau, 1996). Although the theoretical literature elaborating the
gains from institutional changes is vast and growing (Bromley,
1989; Saleth and Dinar, 2000), empirical studies examining drivers
of institutional change are scarce due to lack of suitable data sets.
Appropriately chosen case studies can provide deeper insights into
the role of changing external conditions in stimulating institutional
change, and may  be used to formulate hypotheses on driving forces
of institutional change that can be tested at a larger scale.
In  Minle County, one of the six counties in Zhangye City, a large
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.potato processing factory was established in 2008. The factory is
owned by Aviko Gansu Potato Processing Co., Ltd., a joint venture
of Aviko – one of the four largest potato processing companies in
the world – and the local government of Minle County. To meet
ater M
t
C
g
b
m
o
t
M
o
t
Z
i
e
t
i
a
i
r
t
u
a
e
b
o
t
c
l
o
m
b
d
f
n
t
a
m
t
l
t
t
e
w
r
ﬁ
2
c
u
i
n
n
ﬂ
a
n
t
u
o
r
p
d
i
(Hubbard, 1997; Gilligan, 2004; Williamson, 2007; Jia and Huang,
2011; Takasaki et al., 2012). In transaction cost economics, “econ-
omizing on transaction cost is taken to be the cutting edge, [. . ..]:L. Zhang et al. / Agricultural W
he demand of this factory, the area grown with potatoes in Minle
ounty is rapidly being expanded at the instigation of the local
overnment. Potatoes need a relatively large amount of water,
ut the water should be applied at a later stage in the season than
any other crops grown in the region. A detailed examination
f the changes in the allocation of water to farm households and
he trading of water by households that occurred since 2008 in
inle County may  add to a better understanding of the impact of
utput market development on water institutions. Given the fact
hat Minle County is located within the water-saving pilot area of
hangye City, such research may  also provide important insights
nto further policy reforms that are needed for establishing an
fﬁcient system of water resources property rights allocation and
rading.
The objective of this paper is to examine the changes in water
nstitutions that took place in Minle County, northern China
fter the establishment of a large potato processing company
n 2008, and the driving forces of these changes, and to use the
esulting insights to formulate policy recommendations on ways
o improve the functioning of water institutions. To this end, we
se data collected for the year 2009 among 315 households to
ssess the frequency of water exchanges after the company was
stablished, and to examine factors affecting water exchanges
etween households. We  ﬁnd that despite the development of the
utput market, no signiﬁcant water trading emerged. Informa-
ion asymmetry between government and water users severely
onstrains the water use rights exchanges in the region, while
ow levels of non-kinship trust among villagers entail that most
bserved exchanges take the form of water swapping instead of
arket exchanges. We  conclude that without addressing these
ottlenecks, output market development is unlikely to boost the
evelopment of a tradable water use rights markets.
In the next section we present the theoretical framework,
ocusing in particular on efﬁciency gains obtained by market and
on-market water institutions, the role of transaction costs, and
he impact of exogenous and endogenous factors on water man-
gement institutions. Recent developments in irrigation water
anagement in China are brieﬂy summarized in Section 3, while
he research area (Minle County, Zhangye City) and the data col-
ection method are introduced in Section 4. In Section 5, we use
he survey data and insights gained through informal ﬁeld visits
o examine water exchanges that occurred in the year 2009 and to
xplain the very limited development of market and non-market
ater institutions in the region. The conclusions of our study and
ecommendations for further research and for policy making in this
eld are presented in Section 6.
. Theoretical framework
Water is used for many purposes such as irrigation in agri-
ulture, hydropower generation, domestic consumption, industrial
se and for environmental purposes. Water has an economic value
n all its competing uses and should therefore be treated as an eco-
omic good (ICWE, 1992). Due to its physical attributes, however,
atural water is not a standard (private) economic good. Due to its
uid nature, exclusion is frequently impossible or may  be obtained
t high costs. The consumption of water is considered by humans as
on-rival and non-exclusive when it is available in abundant quan-
ities. It stops being a pure public good when the consumption or
se by one person affects the utility or production possibilities of
thers. But, like many other environmental resources, it tends to
emain non-exclusive long after it ﬁrst became rival (Ellis, 1993,
p. 259–260).
With rising water scarcity, due to population growth, economic
evelopment or other factors, the need for social investments
n barriers to access rises. Appropriate water institutions (suchanagement 131 (2014) 70– 78 71
as well-deﬁned water rights and water markets) are required to
achieve an efﬁcient allocation of water over its users such that the
total net beneﬁts of water are maximized. Water institutions can
be deﬁned as the humanly devised constraints that regulate water
development, allocation and utilization. Different institutions are
combined in reality for water management, and continued public
sector participation is required to deal with the common property
character of water and to address externalities1 (Grifﬁn, 2006). As
a result, various types of water institutions have been established
in different areas around the globe.
According to the ﬁrst welfare theorem, Pareto efﬁcient allo-
cations of water can be achieved by establishing water property
(use) rights and water markets, provided transaction costs are zero
and a number of additional conditions, such as absence of exter-
nalities, are satisﬁed. A resource being managed as a transferable
property will cause a market to arise and the market will produce a
resource-conserving signal, namely its price (Grifﬁn, 2006). When
individual agents possess property rights in (natural) water, they
will be able to exchange water for money or other property.
Water trading means the exchange of water rights by willing
buyers and sellers. Water trading is a scarcity-addressing strat-
egy to achieve Pareto efﬁciency because water can be used to its
highest value, when the conditions under which the ﬁrst welfare
theorem holds are met (e.g. Zhu and Van Ierland, 2012). Economic
theory suggests that, in a perfect market with full information, trad-
ing of water takes place until the marginal net beneﬁts of all users
are equalized. When a water trading scheme is implemented, the
amount of water being transferred therefore depends on the differ-
ences between the marginal net beneﬁts of different users. With a
relatively large difference in marginal net beneﬁts, water users are
expected to trade water (transfer water rights). If there exist only
small differences between the marginal net beneﬁts, the traded
amounts are expected to be small.
The existence of imperfect information in water market opera-
tions, however, contributes to high costs of searching, bargaining
and other transaction costs that can pose a serious hurdle for direct
market exchanges. Under such conditions, water transactions may
take place through non-market institutions. The transaction cost
approach in the so-called new institutional economics (NIE) pro-
vides an appropriate tool to understand market and non-market
exchanges under non-zero transaction costs (Williamson, 1979,
2007; Jia and Huang, 2011). Several basic forms of (market and
non-market) water transactions can be distinguished, including
exchanges in kind, temporary rentals, permanent sales of rights,
and various forms of option contracts (Young, 1986).
From the transaction costs perspective, the difference between
two traders’ marginal beneﬁts of water evaluated at their initial
holding levels must be large enough to offset the marginal trans-
action costs involved in water trading under market institutions.
If transaction costs are high, especially when they exceed the dif-
ferences in marginal beneﬁts for many potential traders, they may
become an obstacle to water trading. In such cases, non-markets
institutions can serve as market substitutes for better resource
allocation by economizing on transaction costs; well-known exam-
ples of non-market institutions that have developed to reduce
transaction costs in insurance, credit and labour markets include
share cropping, contract farming, and reciprocal labour sharing1 In this study, we  focus on the functioning of a water market which is an impor-
tant  element of the water-saving pilot project in Zhangye City. Potential externalities
such as salinity of water are neglected, because the main water source in this region
is  surface water.
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ransactions, with different attributes, are aligned with governance
tructures, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect
 transaction cost economizing outcome (Williamson, 2007, p. 17).
An important institution that receives much attention within
IE is that of contracts. Contracts can be deﬁned as the means
hereby parities design transactions to their mutual advantage
Hubbard, 1997). Contracts can be formal and informal. An example
f (usually informal) contracts are agricultural labour exchanges in
hich multiple farmers temporarily pool their labour into teams
nd complete a task on each team member’s land in succession.
hese strict reciprocal labour-sharing arrangements without pay-
ents allow working capital constrained farmers in developing
ountries to increase their productivity in the context of credit
nd labour market imperfections (Gilligan, 2004). Incentive and/or
nforcement problems may  be mitigated in team work through
eputation mechanisms to secure future labour on the own farm,
utual monitoring, social norms and peer pressure. In a case
tudy on forest clearing among shifting cultivators in the Peru-
ian Amazon, both the efﬁciency and productivity of labour-sharing
nstitutions is found to be higher as compared to labour mar-
et exchanges under credit market imperfections (Takasaki et al.,
012).
Likewise, a theoretical justiﬁcation exists for reciprocal water-
haring use arrangements because of its Pareto efﬁciency.
nalogous to reciprocal labour sharing arrangements, smallholder
armers in thin agricultural water markets may  use reciprocal water
se arrangements to realize efﬁciency gains in water use while
conomizing on the transaction costs involved in water trading. To
ur knowledge, this alternative to market exchanges of irrigation
ater has not been examined in the literature so far.
An important factor affecting transaction costs in market and
on-market exchanges is trust. In the absence of sufﬁcient trust,
arket participants must protect themselves against moral hazard
r even theft through monitoring, contract writing and other costly
nitiatives, and should be prepared to litigate in case of default. In
ow-trust societies, people are therefore more likely to use infor-
al  arrangements, trading only with people they know and relying
n informal punishment mechanisms (Easterly, 2005). Supportive
mpirical evidence is provided by Tu and Bulte (2010) in a study
f rice farmers in southeast China. Making a distinction between
ocal trust (trust among friends and family) and general trust (trust
owards the community more broadly deﬁned—encompassing a
reater set of potential trading partners), their study ﬁnds that high
evels of general trust are associated with the use of labour markets,
hile high levels of local trust are associated with a greater proba-
ility to engage in reciprocal labour sharing arrangements. By the
ame token, general and local trust can be expected to play impor-
ant roles in household decisions on using either formal water
arkets or informal non-market exchange mechanisms.
Efﬁciency gains of different market and non-market water insti-
utions are achieved through changes in the production costs
transformation costs) of water users (Saleth and Dinar, 2004;
rifﬁn, 2006; Zhu and Van Ierland, 2012). The type of water insti-
utions in place greatly affects the efﬁciency of water allocation.
he performance of water institutions can therefore be viewed
rom the perspective of their functioning, i.e. operations such as
ctive transfers of water rights. Various factors affect this rela-
ionship between the performance of water institutions and the
fﬁciency gains of water users. Previous studies make a distinction
etween endogenous factors, such as water scarcity and ﬁnancial
onstraints, and exogenous factors, such as macroeconomic reform,
olitical reform, international agreements, natural calamities, and
echnological progress (e.g. Saleth and Dinar, 2000).
With respect to endogenous factors, the relative scarcity of
ater and the transaction costs required to enforce water rights
nd establish water markets are found to have signiﬁcant impactsanagement 131 (2014) 70– 78
on the functioning of water institutions. Water scarcity, arising e.g.
from competing uses of water, creates an endogenous pressure for
change, inducing change in the performance of water institutions
and thus water-using sectors (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). In locations
where market exchanges are novel or infrequent, transaction costs
can be especially high due to a lack of familiarity either by mar-
ket participants, their legal representatives, or the administrative
agency (Grifﬁn, 2006).
The performance of water institutions is also affected by exoge-
nous factors such as historical forces, political arrangements,
demographic conditions, resource endowments, and economic
development. Economic policies, especially macroeconomic and
trade (export market) reforms, also play an important role in pro-
viding impetus for institutional changes within the water sector
(Saleth and Dinar, 2004).
Given that various (endogenous and exogenous) factors inﬂu-
ence the performance of water institutions, it follows that similar
water institutions that operate in different environments may
greatly differ in their performances. It also means that the actual
performance of an existing water institution in a given setting is an
empirical question. Gaining insights into the most important fac-
tors explaining institutional change and performance in the water
sector is not only relevant from a scientiﬁc point of view, but may
also contribute to the design of policies that stimulate a more efﬁ-
cient use of limited water resources. This study intends to add to the
literature in this ﬁeld by performing a case study of the impact of
agricultural output market development on the development and
performance of water market exchanges and reciprocal water use
arrangements.
3. Irrigation water management in China
Before the agrarian reforms in China in the late 1970s, water
resources were managed primarily through collective owner-
ship arrangements. Since the start of the reforms, a variety
of institutional arrangements have been established to govern
water resources (Mukherji and Shah, 2005; Zhang et al., 2008).
Besides contracting out of water management and joint manage-
ment through water users associations (WUAs), recent changes
in irrigation water management in China mainly involve tradable
water use rights and introduction of water pricing (Qu et al., 2011;
Wang et al., 2010).
The establishment of water markets was  made possible by the
revised national Water Law that came into force in late 2002
(Yuan and Chen, 2005). However, water markets in China are
at an elementary stage and are generally occurring outside of a
structured trading framework (WET, 2007). Examples of water use
rights (WUR) exchange to date mainly include sales from one local
government to another, and the transfer of WUR  from irrigation
districts to industries following water efﬁciency initiatives (Speed,
2009). Notably, these have been driven by the relevant govern-
ments and not by the free market (Speed, 2009).
Water was  generally considered a free good until the start of the
market-oriented agricultural reforms at the end of the 1970s. Since
then the central government encouraged the adoption of a system
of volumetric surface-water pricing because prices may  provide
incentives for using water more efﬁciently (Lohmar et al., 2003; Qu
et al., 2011). Water fees were gradually introduced and increased
in an effort to meet the cost of water supply and improve water
efﬁciency. Current prices charged for irrigation water, however, are
generally believed to be well below levels that are efﬁcient (i.e. that
markets would set). Irrigation water prices often do not even cover
the costs of operating and maintaining irrigation systems (Hussain,
2005; Wang et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2003). This may  hinder the
efﬁcient allocation of water under the prevailing water institutions.
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et al., 2013, for more information).
Table 1 presents background information for some key variables
that were investigated in the survey. The average land holding size
3 1 USD = 6.83 RMB  (2009).L. Zhang et al. / Agricultural W
. Description of the research area and data collection
In our research we use information that we collected via a house-
old survey held in Minle County, Zhangye City, Gansu Province. In
his section we ﬁrst introduce the research area and then brieﬂy
iscuss the method of data collection.
.1. Research area
Zhangye City is an oasis located midstream of the Heihe River, an
nland river that ﬂows across Qinghai Province, Gansu Province and
nner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The river originates from the
ilianshan Mountains in Qinghai province, crosses the Hexi corri-
or in Gansu Province, and ends in Juyanhai Lake in Inner Mongolia.
n the midstream of the Heihe River watershed, the land is ﬂat, sun-
hine is abundant, and annual precipitation is very low while the
vaporation is high. But due to the availability of irrigation water
rom the Heihe River, the area has become a major grain and veg-
tables production base in Gansu province.
According to the Ministry of Water Resources (2004), Zhangye
ity is severely short of water resources, even though it uses up
lmost all the water of the Heihe River. Only 50% of the farmland
s well irrigated, and much arable land has been abandoned due to
ater shortage. Agriculture accounts for approximately 95% of all
ater use and almost all water in the Heihe River is extracted for
rrigation use. As a result, too little water ﬂows into Juyanhai Lake.
he lake dried out in 1992 and an area of 200 km2 around the lake
ecame a desert (Zhang et al., 2009).
Minle County is located between the foothills of the Qilianshan
ountains and the lower lying Hexi corridor. Its total cultivated
and area equals 860,000 mu 2, with irrigated land constituting
7%. Major crops in Minle County include barley, wheat, maize,
esame, rapeseed, garlic and potato. Surface water is the major
ater resource for irrigated agriculture in the area. According to
he Water Bureau of Minle County, the use of groundwater is less
han 5% of total water use in irrigated agriculture due to the high
osts of pumping water from the wells.
Precipitation is Minle County, as in other parts of Zhangye City,
s unevenly distributed. The wet season is from May  to September;
t provides around 80% of yearly rainfall. The dry season is from
ctober to April. Irrigation in Minle County is carried out from
he beginning of May  to late-August. The period until June has a
eak demand for water, but the rainfall during those two  months is
imited. These two months are known by local farmers in Zhangye
ity as the ‘choked period’ (Chen et al., 2005).
The water used for surface irrigation in Minle County is stored in
even reservoirs in the Qilianshan mountains, serving ﬁve irrigation
reas within Minle County. A county-level water management
ureau (WMB)  supervises the water allocation institutions within
he region.
Five lower-level WMBs, one for each of the ﬁve irrigation areas,
rrange the water allocation to WUAs within their own irrigation
rea. A standard water allocation quota is assigned to the so-called
UR land of the WUAs within the irrigation area served by a WMB.
ot all the irrigated land is classiﬁed as WUR  land. Its size depends
n the labour that was provided by a village to the construction
f the reservoirs, the WUR  land obtained by a WUA  through auc-
ions, and other factors. Based on the actual availability of water in
 reservoir in each year, a certain percentage of this standard water
uota is actually distributed to the WUAs within the irrigation area
f a WMB.
WUAs are responsible for arranging the water allocation to
ts member households. The households within each WUA  are
2 One mu is equal to 1/15 ha.anagement 131 (2014) 70– 78 73
sub-divided into water user groups (WUGs), consisting of house-
holds having plots along the same channel. Since the plots of
different households within a WUG  are irrigated at the same
time, households belonging to a WUG  need to coordinate their
planting decisions and water demands. Water use is measured at
the entrance of the second-level canals, and corrected for esti-
mated losses that occur between the point of measurement and
the destination point. The water price charged was  approximately
0.09 RMB/m3 in 2009 3. Households can trade their WUR  with other
households, provided the price that is charged does not exceed
0.3 RMB/m3.
The new potato processing company that was  established in
Minle County in 2008 demands a speciﬁc variety of potatoes, named
Atlantic potatoes, for processing into ﬂakes and starch. In order to
meet the growing demand for Atlantic potatoes, the local govern-
ment (which owns a major stake in the new factory) assigned quota
for Atlantic planting areas to lower level governments. And it also
ordered the WMBs  (the ‘sellers’ of irrigation water) in the region to
give priority to land planted with Atlantic potatoes in the allocation
of water to the WUAs with in their districts.
The water allocation priority policy requires that in spite of the
water scarcity in the region, a sufﬁcient amount of irrigation water
has to be reserved for irrigating Atlantic potatoes. The remaining
quantity of irrigation water is allocated to land planted with other
crops. Speciﬁcally, water is allocated to Atlantic potatoes according
to its actual planting area, while water allocation to other crops is
based on the WUR  area. Normally the WUR  area is smaller than the
actual growing area4. Moreover, one to three rounds5 of irrigation
are carried out for most crops, while four or ﬁve rounds are carried
out for Atlantic potatoes.
4.2. Data collection
A household survey, covering the year 2009, was  held in Minle
County in May  2010. One of the purposes of the survey was to
examine the changes that took place in irrigation water allocation
and water markets since the establishment of the new company
and the concomitant expansion of the potato market. In a base-
line survey, covering the year 2007 and carried out in May  2008,
irrigating households were found not to undertake any (market or
non-market) water transactions.
The household survey in May  2010 was  carried out by staff and
students from Gansu Academy of Social Sciences, Gansu Agricul-
tural University, and Nanjing Agricultural University. The dataset
includes information about, among others, crop production, use
of water and other inputs, water transactions, WUA  participation,
water and other prices, land tenure and land use. To ensure that all
townships would be equally represented, the population in Minle
County was stratiﬁed into 10 townships. Ten percent of the villages
in each stratum were randomly selected, giving a total sample of
21 villages. In each of the 21 selected villages, 15 households were
randomly selected to be interviewed. This gave us a dataset con-
taining 315 observations6 (see Wachong Castro et al., 2010, and Ma4 The average proportion of WUR  land in total arable land is 72.6% for all house-
holds in our sample.
5 Depending on their altitudes, some villages receive one or two rounds of
irrigation, while others receive three rounds.
6 Out of the 315 households that were interviewed in the 2009 survey, 265 house-
holds were also interviewed in the baseline survey covering the year 2007. The other
50  households could not be found, and were replaced by other randomly selected
households within the same village.
74 L. Zhang et al. / Agricultural Water Management 131 (2014) 70– 78
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of some key variables in the household survey.
Agricultural production inputs
Variables Unit No. of observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max
Land mu 312 19.6 11.1 1.60 71.3
Labour  days/mu 310 8.29 6.90 0.80 58.9
Water  m3/mu  308 483 220 53.3 1420
Fertilizer jin/mu 312 208 77.9 33.5 626
Seed  jin/mu 309 74.8 42.1 7.67 381
Age  of head years 315 46.4 10.2 23 78
Education of head years 314 7.52 3.51 0 15
33.3 33.2 0.5 256.5
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Table 2
Water transactions in Hongshuihe irrigation area in 2003, 2007 and 2009.
2003 2007 2009
Number of households interviewed 380 105 105
Number of households with water transactions 5 0 7Total  production value RMB/mu 302 
ote: 1 jin = 0.5 kg.
f the surveyed households equals 1.3 ha, about twice the average
ize of landholdings in rural China (which equals 0.6 ha according
o the 2006 Agricultural Census). There exists considerable vari-
tion in landholding sizes, ranging from 0.1 ha for the smallest
olding to 4.8 ha for the largest one. Average irrigation water use
quals 483 m3/mu. It varies from 53.3 to 1420 m3/mu  in the sam-
le. Fertilizer use is high, like in many parts of rural China with
redominantly irrigated agriculture. The average fertilizer use for
he households in our sample amounts to 1560 kg/ha.
Table 1 According to the Minle County Statistical Yearbook
009, the amount of rainfall during May-August 2009 was equal to
18.3 mm,  with the largest amount of rainfall in August: 107.6 mm.
recipitation during the survey year is considered as average by the
MB of Minle County.
. Water allocation and water transactions in Minle County
Out of the 315 households that we interviewed in the survey,
5 (4.8%) answered that they traded water in 2009. As mentioned
bove, none of the households interviewed in the baseline sur-
ey covering the year 2007 answered that they traded water. The
5 farm households engaged in water transactions in our study
re located in nine different villages7 in six different townships.
mong these 15 households, seven are living in one irrigation area,
he Hongshuihe irrigation area. With 105 of the 315 interviewed
ouseholds living in the Hongshuihe area, this means that 6.7% of
he interviewed households in that area answered that they traded
ater in 2009.
These data may  be compared with those collected in an ear-
ier study on tradable water rights in Zhangye City reported in
hang et al. (2009). In that study, survey data covering the year
003 were collected in ﬁve different irrigation areas (out of the 25
ain irrigation areas in Zhangye City). Only one of those irrigation
reas, Hongshuihe, is located in Minle County; the other four
re located in other counties. Zhang et al. (2009) ﬁnd no water
xchanges in the four irrigation areas where there are groundwa-
er sources, and a very limited number of water exchanges in the
ongshuihe irrigation area, where use of groundwater is not a real-
stic alternative due to the high pumping costs involved. Among the
80 households in the Hongshuihe irrigation area interviewed in
heir survey, ﬁve households traded water with other households.
ll transactions took place within the own village, and against
ayment. The average price was 0.025 USD/m3 (or 0.20 RMB/m3),
hile the average traded quantity amounted to 123 m3.
Table 2 summarizes the trend in water transactions in the Hong-
huihe irrigation area based on Zhang et al. (2009) and our two
urveys. The data suggest a slightly increasing trend over time, but
7 The nine villages (and the number of households involved) are: Yangjiajuan (2),
ubacun (1), Erzhaicun (1), Yushumiao (2), Mazhuangcun (2), Wujiazhuang (2),
anpucun (1), Wulangcun (3) and Zhujiangzhuang (2).Percentage of households with water transactions 1.3 0 6.7
Sources: Zhang et al. (2009) for 2003; our surveys for 2007 and 2009
overall the percentage of households involved in water transactions
remains very small.
Water transactions are closely related to land rental transactions
among households, since rented land also needs water8. When land
is being rented out to other households, the water rights belonging
to that land are normally part of the same deal. In our analysis
we disregard these so-called long term trades, as deﬁned by Zhang
et al. (2009), consisting of water and land use rights that are being
transferred together. For the purpose of our analysis it is water
transfers without parallel land transfers that matters.
Even though the number of observations on water transactions
is rather limited, and is insufﬁcient to do any meaningful statis-
tical analyses, a closer look at the available information on these
exchanges may  provide some useful insights. Table 3 provides more
detailed information about the water transactions undertaken by
each of the 15 households that were involved in water transfers in
2009. As can be seen from the table, 12 out of the 15 households
that transferred water were actually swapping water without pay-
ments. That is to say, a household received an amount of water
from another household in one round of irrigation and returned the
same amount of water in another round, or even within the same
round. Such water swaps normally occur between households that
are very familiar with each other. As discussed in Section 2, such
(non-market) reciprocal water use arrangements are very similar to
labour-sharing arrangements that are frequently observed in peas-
ant agriculture. The quantities of water that were exchanged in this
way varied from 10 to 540 m3, with an average of 280 m3.
Trading through water markets is almost non-existent. Two of
the 15 households bought water from another household (at a price
of 0.1 RMB/m3, almost equal to the fee of 0.094 RMB/m3 paid for
the allocated water) in one irrigation round in 2009, and sold the
same quantity of water (100 and 150 m3, respectively) to the same
household at the same price in another irrigation round in 2009. So
in fact they were also swapping water, but against a ﬁxed payment.
Only one household that swapped water with another household
also bought a large quantity of water (3000 m3) later in the season
at a price of 0.2 RMB/m3. And ﬁnally there was one household that
received 900 m3 of water without payment in 2009 and also bought
some water (100 m3) at a price of 0.16 RMB/m3 early in the year.
8 Out of the 315 households in our sample, 135 households (i.e. 43%) were involved
in  land transfers in the year 2009.
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Table 3
Traded water quantities and prices in Minle County, 2009.
Household Atlantic potatoes
grower
Direction Quantity (m3) Price (RMB/m3) Time Direction Quantity (m3) Price (RMB/m3) Time
1 no in 150 0 NA Out 150 0 NA
2  yes in 440 0 12 June Out 440 0 12 July
3  no in 10 0 April Out 10 0 June
4  yes in 100 0.1 July Out 100 0.1 August
5  no out 350 0 August In 350 0 September
6  yes in
in
240
3000
0
0.2
12 June
20 Sept.
Out 240 0 17 June
7  yes in 400 0 Early July Out 400 0 End July
8  yes out 150 0.1 May  In 150 0.1 June
9  yes in 250 0 May  Out 250 0 May
10  no in 25 0 3 June Out 25 0 10 June
11  yes in 500 0 May  Out 500 0 May
12  yes in 350 0 August Out 350 0 2010
13  yes in 540 0 20 June Out 540 0 20 Sept.
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a14  no in 900 0 
15  yes in 100 0 
A = not available.
This raises the question why almost all of the (rather limited
umber of) water transactions that we observed took the form of
eciprocal water sharing arrangements. By exchanging water, both
arties can beneﬁt from seasonal variations in water values. But
hat would also be the case if water transactions take place through
 market. As suggested by Tu and Bulte (2010), levels of general
nd local trust may  play a role in deciding to use either market
r non-market exchanges. Although farmers in our research area
ossess tradable water use rights, they do not possess certiﬁcates
f those rights. Trading of water may  therefore easily cause conﬂicts
etween buyers and sellers. The perceived risks of water transac-
ions depend on the extent to which both sides believe that the
ther side can be trusted.
The baseline survey carried out in May  2008 contained ques-
ions about trust. Respondents were asked to indicate their trust
evel to 10 different groups (parents, brothers/sisters, children,
ther relatives, local ofﬁcials, classmates/peers, neighbours, famil-
ar (known) people, staff in companies, strangers), using a scale
rom 0 (totally distrust) to 1 (fully trust). Ma  (2013) performed fac-
or analysis, using the standard method of principal-component
actors, to analyse the answers to these questions. Based on rotated
actor loadings (pattern matrix), he distinguished between kin-
hip trust (trust to parents, brothers/sisters and children), trust
owards known people (the trust towards classmates/peers, neigh-
ours and familiar (known) people) and trust towards strangers
trust towards staff in companies and strangers). The observed
verage levels of trust equal 0.96 for kinship trust, 0.79 for trust
owards known people, and only 0.44 for trust towards strangers.
a  (2013) uses these results to explain the segmented and under-
eveloped land rental market in the region.9 Our ﬁnding that the
imited number of water transaction in the region are reciprocal
ransactions between households that are very familiar with each
ther, while impersonal market transactions are virtual absent,
ay  be explained in a similar vain.
What role did the establishment of the potato processing com-
any and the priority given to Atlantic potatoes in water allocation
lay in promoting these water exchanges? Among the 15 house-
olds who were involved in water transactions in 2009, ten
ouseholds (i.e. 2/3) grew Atlantic potatoes that were supplied
o the new company. Out of the 315 households that we  inter-
iewed, 105 (i.e. only 1/3) grew Atlantic potatoes in 2009. Hence,
9 The regression results presented in Ma  (2013) show that trust towards known
eople has a signiﬁcant positive effect on the probability and intensity of land renting
nd  on the use of informal rental contracts.June In 100 1.6 January
5 June Out 100 0 20 June
Atlantic potatoes growers were relatively more involved in water
transactions than other farmers.
As mentioned before, Atlantic potatoes require a relatively large
amount of water, but need it later in the season. They do not
need water during the ﬁrst irrigation round (early May), when
the seedlings are still small, but receive water during the other
irrigation rounds and extra irrigation rounds later in the year. As
discussed in Section 2, water users have an incentive to trade water
whenever the marginal net beneﬁts of water differ between water
users. For Atlantic potatoes growers, the marginal beneﬁts of water
are expected to be relatively low during the ﬁrst irrigation round
and much higher during the later rounds. In our data, however,
we hardly ﬁnd any Atlantic potatoes growers who  provide water
to other households during the ﬁrst round (early May) and obtain
water in return during a later irrigation round (see Table 3). The
spring period is a very dry season in Minle County, and hence
there is a high demand for applying water to most crops during
the ﬁrst irrigation round. It may  therefore be assumed that the
marginal beneﬁt of water is very high for all farmers during the
ﬁrst irrigation round, and no water transactions take place. Later in
the year, when there is more precipitation, the marginal beneﬁts
of irrigation water become lower. The water that Atlantic potatoes
farmers receive during extra irrigation rounds may  not always ﬁt
the growing requirements of the crop. Hence, it makes sense for
them to swap part of this additional water with other households
in their own WUG  or WUA.
Why  did only ten of the Atlantic potatoes growers exchange
water in 2009, and the other 95 did not? A number of factors may
explain the low incidence of water transactions. Firstly, knowl-
edge may  be an important factor. Households with better-educated
heads may  be more efﬁcient farmers that obtain higher marginal
net beneﬁts of water. The average education level of the head of
the household for all the households who planted Atlantic pota-
toes in 2009 and did not exchange water is 7.95 years, while that
of Atlantic potatoes growers who  exchanged water in 2009 is 8.50
years on average (see Table 4). But the difference is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Secondly, a larger area planted with Atlantic potatoes results
in the allocation of more water due to the water allocation pri-
ority policy, and may  induce water selling. It may  also induce
water swapping if the additional water is delivered at times when
the marginal beneﬁts it provides to Atlantic potatoes farmers are
lower than those in other irrigation rounds and are lower than the
marginal beneﬁts it offers to other farmers during the same round of
irrigation. In 2009, the size of the area planted with Atlantic pota-
toes for the ten Atlantic potatoes growers that exchanged water
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Table 4
Characteristics of Atlantic potatoes growers.
Education of head (years) Arable land (mu) Atlantic potatoes area (mu) WUR  land (mu)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Atlantic potatoes growers 8.00 2.42 20.0 11.2 0.92 0.657 15.3 11.7
Exchanging water 8.50 2.97 22.0 12.4 1.04 0.847 20.0** 7.0
Others 7.95 2.91 19.8 11.1 0.91 0.638 14.8** 7.6
Whole sample 7.49 3.51 19.6 12.5 0.31 0.575 13.8 7.8
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sell or buy water at prices that most likely will exceed the current
ﬁxed water price and in some cases perhaps even the current ceiling
on the water price.** Indicates that the difference between the group means is statistically signiﬁcan
re  not signiﬁcant at the 10% level for farmers exchanging water and other Atlantic
as 1.04 mu  while it was 0.91 mu  for the other farm households
rowing Atlantic potatoes (Table 4). But again the difference is not
tatistically signiﬁcant. Likewise, the difference in the total arable
and size did not differ signiﬁcantly between the two  groups in
009. One important aspect that differed signiﬁcantly (at a 5% test-
ng level) was the size of the WUR  land (see the last two  columns of
able 4). Atlantic potatoes farmers who exchanged water had sig-
iﬁcantly more WUR  land (22.0 mu  on average) than other Atlantic
otatoes farmers (14.8 mu  on average). As mentioned in Section 3,
ater is allocated to crops other than Atlantic potatoes according
o their WUR  area. Therefore, households owning land with a large
UR area receive more water for irrigating all their crops than
ouseholds with relatively small WUR  areas, and may  ﬁnd it prof-
table to swap part of this water with other households to make it
t better to their crop growing requirements.
An important aspect of the functioning of water markets is the
ricing of water. Under a proper water trading scheme, the water
rice should reﬂect its marginal value to buyers and sellers. In the
bsence of transaction costs, each unit of water will be worth the
ame at the margin to each agent after the exchange. For this to
appen, water users should be free to set their own  water prices.
owever, water prices are not fully market determined in Minle
ounty. According to the Bureau of Water Resource Management
n Zhangye City, the prices of exchanged water are not allowed to
xceed 0.3 RMB/m3. If a household charges a higher price for its
UR, the WUR  allocated to that household can be withdrawn by
he local government.
High transaction costs may  also be an important obstacle to the
evelopment of water markets (see Section 2). Transaction costs
aced by households interested in trading water include time and
osts involved in acquiring information on possible water trad-
ng procedures, in searching for households willing to sell or buy
ater, in negotiating the conditions of the water transfer, and in
onitoring and enforcing water transfers (see also Zhang et al.,
009). As discussed above, trust may  play an important role in
his respect. Low levels of trust result in relatively high transac-
ion costs. The water exchanges that we observed in our survey
ll occurred between relatives or neighbours, where levels of trust
end to be high.
Information that we obtained during ﬁeld visits and informal
alks with farmers provides additional insights into the reasons for
he almost complete absence of market transactions. In the ﬁrst
lace, the amount of water allocated to households is often con-
idered insufﬁcient for irrigating all the crops that they planted,
et alone that they would have redundant water for selling. This
mplies that it is difﬁcult for households willing to buy water to
nd potential sellers, given the prevailing water price ceiling. In
he second place, if there exist large differences in marginal bene-
ts of water between farm households, the incentives for trading
ater will be large. In our research area, however, differencesn marginal beneﬁts between farm households may  be relatively
mall. Irrigation requirements mean that farmers need to tune
heir crop choice and management decisions with other households
ithin the same WUGs and WUAs. As a result, farmers within thee 5% testing level. The differences between the mean values of the other variables
oes growers.
same WUA  tend to grow similar crops with similar (planting and
irrigation) technologies.
Costs of obtaining (reliable) information are an important ele-
ment of transaction costs. In our survey held in May  2010 we
asked questions about farmers’ understanding of the tradability
of their WUR  in 2007 and 2009. Although the exchange of WUR
is permitted since 2002 in this area, only 9.8% of the interviewed
households were aware that they could buy or sell water against
payment, while 24.1% realized that they were allowed to swap
water use rights in 2007. In 2009, these percentages were only
slightly higher: 10.8% thought that they were allowed to buy or
sell water, and 27.9% mentioned that they were allowed to swap
water (Table 5).10 In conclusion, these data suggest that informa-
tion asymmetry between the government and water users may  be
one of the main obstacles to water trading in this region.
As mentioned above, the price that farmers can charge for water
should not exceed 0.3 RMB/m3. Theoretically, the price constraint is
expected to affect water market transactions by limiting the sup-
ply of water and increasing its demand. However, in our survey
we found that only six respondents were aware of the upper limit
set by the government. Therefore, the price limit does not seem to
constrain market exchanges of WUR  in this case.
Given the current low water price and limited availability of
water, the marginal beneﬁts of water may  exceed the actual water
price (0.09 RMB/m3 on average) for many farmers. Zhang (2013)
estimated crop-speciﬁc marginal water values, based on a system
of crop production functions, for the 315 farm households that
we interviewed in Minle County. The estimated marginal values
equal 0.046 RMB/m3 for grains, and 0.266, 0.543 and 0.567 RMB/m3
for Atlantic potatoes, other potatoes and other cash crops, respec-
tively. In other words, crop-speciﬁc marginal values are far from
being equal and there remains much scope for gains to be obtained
from water trade, especially between grain-oriented and cash crop
oriented farmers.
We  can conclude that the low water price, the lack of appro-
priate information and the low level of trust towards unknown
persons seem to limit the functioning of the water market, even
though a tradable WUR  system has been introduced through the
pilot project and despite the fact that the establishment of the large
potato processing company has created more economic incentives
for water trading. If farmers would be well-informed that they are
allowed to exchange WUR, if they would be free in choosing a water
price without any restriction, and if appropriate conﬂict resolution
mechanisms would be in place, more farmers will be expected to10 Most households that answered positively to these questions for the year 2007
also  gave a positive response for the year 2009: 9.2% (buying or selling) and 21.3%
(swapping) respectively. In addition, the majority of the households that answered
positively to the question about buying or selling also answered positively to the
question about swapping water: 8.3% for the year 2007 and 8.6% for the year 2009.
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Table 5
Farmers’ understanding of water exchange rights.
Are you allowed to swap water with others?
2007 2009
Yes (%) No (%) No idea (%) Yes (%) No (%) No idea (%)
24.1  52.4 23.5 27.9 48.9 23.2
Are  you allowed to buy or sell water?
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9.8  64.4 25.7 
. Conclusion
In this study we examine irrigation water exchanges in a region
n China where households possess tradable water use rights,
here a major agro-processing company has recently been estab-
ished, and where the local government intervenes in the allocation
f water to stimulate farmers to grow a cash crop for that com-
any. Despite these favourable enabling and driving factors, we
nd that water market transactions are virtually absent. Instead,
e observe that reciprocal water use arrangements (water swaps)
ave emerged at a limited scale.
The case crop stimulated by the new company and the local gov-
rnment, Atlantic potatoes, needs a relatively large amount of water
or growing, but it needs it later in the season than many other
rops grown in the region. The water swaps that we observed take
lace between relatives or neighbours, with usually no payments
nvolved, and seems to be meant to improve the timing of water
pplications to crops with different seasonal water requirements.
A more detailed analysis of the observed water exchanges
hows that a relatively large share of Atlantic potatoes farmers
re involved, and that these farmers tend to have better access to
rrigation water than other farmers. We  further argue that high
ransaction costs, resulting from existing information asymmetry
etween the government and farmers and from low levels of trust in
nknown people, severely limit the trading of water. In 2009 only
7.9% of the interviewed households was aware that they were
llowed to swap water with others, while only 10.8% knew that
hey were allowed to buy or sell water against payment. Out of
hese, only a minority (1.9% of the entire sample) knew the maxi-
um  price they are allowed to charge in trading water. The few paid
ransaction that we observed in our survey took place at prices that
ere close to the price set by the government for standard water
llocations to farmers. High levels of trust towards kinship and
nown people as compared to unknown people seem to play a role
n our ﬁnding that the few water transactions that we  observe in the
egion consist almost entirely of water swaps, a non-market insti-
ution similar to reciprocal labour sharing arrangements, instead of
arket transactions. Hence, we can conclude that factors other than
n improvement in the output market (such as producer ignorance,
entrally set prices, trust) need to be considered, if improvement
n the market for irrigation water is to occur.
More research is needed into the root causes of these problems,
articularly the information asymmetry, in order to come up with
olicy recommendations on ways to deal with this problems. An
mportant potential explanatory factor that needs to be taken into
ccount in such follow-up research is the extent to which local gov-
rnment self-interests, particularly the workload that promotion
f water trading brings to bureaucrats, plays a role in the cur-
ently existing information asymmetry between the government
nd local farmers.
Other issues that need more attention are how water transac-ion with unknown people can be promoted, given the prevailing
ow levels of trust, and to what extent credit constraints play a
ole in farmers opting for using water swaps instead of market
ransactions. A recent study on tenure security, trust and landYes (%) No (%) No idea (%)
10.8 62.5 26.7
rental market development in rural China, concludes that improve-
ments in the rural legislative system and its implementation may
reduce the costs borne by farm households in protecting their
land rights via formal legal means, such as ofﬁcial meditation
and arbitration and going to the court (Ma, 2013, Chapter 5). The
development of water markets based on impersonal transactions
is likewise expected to gain from a better protection of water use
rights through improvements in the legal system and its imple-
mentation. With respect to credit constraints, the current literature
suggests that they can be an important driving force of reciprocal
labour-sharing arrangements. Given that most water swaps that we
observed in our household survey in Minle County took place with-
out payments, credit constraints may  also be an important driving
factor. Our survey, however, did not include questions that would
allow us to examine this issue.
Given the rather limited number of farmers involved in water
transactions in the research area of this study, further research in
this ﬁeld should preferably use a dataset with sufﬁcient obser-
vations on water transactions to perform meaningful statistical
analyses in order to test the tentative conclusions that we  draw
about factors driving the development of the water market. Such
research should preferably be carried out for multiple years, and
use appropriate methods to correct for the potential impact of
time-dependent factors, like variations in rainfall and water avail-
ability and changes in the (global, national and regional) economic
environment, which we  could not do in our study.
Creating proper institutions for the development of water mar-
kets, reducing transaction costs involved in using water markets
(particularly through provision of more adequate information) and
removing existing restrictions on water prices are important pre-
conditions for improving economic efﬁciency of water use. In the
implementation of these measures, due attention should be given
to potential negative effects on the achievement of other important
policy goals such as reduced income inequality and maintenance
of grain self-sufﬁciency. If such negative effects are found to occur,
appropriate counteracting measures may  need to be undertaken
without compromising the goal of achieving more efﬁcient water
use in irrigated agriculture.
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